

Although *pro se* pleadings are liberally construed, *Boag v. MacDougall*, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the lenient treatment accorded *pro se* plaintiffs has limits. See e.g., *Pilgrim v. Littlefield*, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.1996). *Pro se* litigants must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf. See *Erwin v. Edwards*, 22 Fed. App'x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have a duty to police the boundaries

of their jurisdiction. “[A] district court may, at any time, *sua sponte* dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” *Apple v. Glenn*, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.1999).

The Court finds this action warrants *sua sponte* dismissal pursuant to *Apple v. Glenn*. The allegations in the complaint are so unsubstantial that they do not provide a basis to establish this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

Accordingly, this action is dismissed. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/S/ SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

January 26, 2018